This philosophical masterpiece by Rene Descartes centered in the idea that:
“There is reason to doubt everything I believe”
It is preposterous to propose such connotation when in the “real” life we often hold undisputed belief. So if the so called certain belief is merely an error, do we—to be close to truthfulness—shall stay away from holding such belief?
I think if the proposition can be brew even with a tiny fraction of probability—it is worth considering. Then before we mull over Descartes argument, we shall try to formulate if such probability does exist. The easiest way to verify such possibility is to find out whether our human biological features can be made consistent with the proposition.
One of the apparatus of Big Five personality traits is the openness to experience. What if we can meet with the most “open person” and the most “close person” in the world? What could be the personality of both?
The one that "close" might be living his life with full confident, believing that he is right all the time. There is a huge amount of defense mechanism operated in such confident personal. He might be skeptical of everything except that what he held belief in himself.
On the other hand, the "open" person might be living his life with full insecurity, easily seduce, believing that he is wrong all the time. The insecure person is also very skeptical, not to everything else but to belief held to himself. If such person does exist, our human biology can be made consistent with the proposition of Descartes. Even if the word “everything I believe” is a strong suggestion, our human biology can accommodate to that extent, as apparent to a psychological disorder people.
Let us began with Descartes...
The first meditation is dub as a “dialogue in a single voice”. It is because Descartes write from two points of view which are:
1. doubt is being advance
2. doubt is being resisted
and his whole proposition is being supported by five constructed arguments:
1. the senses have deceived us
What we aware comes from senses. But the senses reveal only what is outside, what is apparent. Deceived senses will mean deceived mind. If senses are prone to be deceived, does not it mean what we aware also prone to uncertainty?
2. some people have mad belief
3. dreaming argument
Have you ever had a dream, Neo, that you were so sure was real? What if you were unable to wake from that dream? How would you know the difference between the dream world and the real world?”~ Morpheus
The matrix movie has said it all. If there is a possibility that we cannot distinguish between when we are asleep and when we are awake, how can we not be a doubter?
4. all powerful God argument
5. malicious demon argument
Wednesday, October 22, 2008
Tuesday, October 21, 2008
Doubt
It is sometimes worth to recall a thought or idea that I strongly believe in the past as absolute truth but now turn to be false and mislead. How does one encountered such changes of paradigm is phenomenon.
The thing I experience in myself every time I was in such situation is not the feeling of embarrassment that I thought I should have but rather the feelings of relief or maybe victory or maybe arrogant and such enlightenment is breathtaking and worth pursuing.
But somehow even though such reward is recognizable, I still find it hard to rationalize with opposite ideas as the wrath of cognitive dissonance is overwhelming me. If for instances that the reward is to be perceived as inferior to one stand to an idea, at least our own cognitive capacity should know for a fact that there is in every given situation a possibility that my ideas is wrong.
Such possibility however insignificant it is must compel me to be more humble and receiver to other opinions. But such possibility can also compel me to doubt every ideas or opinions that I hold right now. This is the proposition brought by Rene Descartes in First Meditation……
The thing I experience in myself every time I was in such situation is not the feeling of embarrassment that I thought I should have but rather the feelings of relief or maybe victory or maybe arrogant and such enlightenment is breathtaking and worth pursuing.
But somehow even though such reward is recognizable, I still find it hard to rationalize with opposite ideas as the wrath of cognitive dissonance is overwhelming me. If for instances that the reward is to be perceived as inferior to one stand to an idea, at least our own cognitive capacity should know for a fact that there is in every given situation a possibility that my ideas is wrong.
Such possibility however insignificant it is must compel me to be more humble and receiver to other opinions. But such possibility can also compel me to doubt every ideas or opinions that I hold right now. This is the proposition brought by Rene Descartes in First Meditation……
Friday, October 17, 2008
Moral Dilemmas (2) by E.J. Lemmon
British philosopher E.J. Lemmon wrote a thought provoking view on moral dilemmas. Lemmon highlights three classes of moral dilemma which I think can be summarized as:
1. Simplest form
2. Dilemmatic in the full sense
3. Extreme moral dilemma
The first type of moral dilemma, Lemmon took seriously the “crisis” of moral dilemmas mentioned in my last piece “the dilemma of moral dilemmas” and it can be sense throughout his writings.
For him, there is no contradiction between “ought to” and “ought not” simply because it is not a will like “must” and “must not”. So I ought to close the window and I ought not to close the window at the same time because “ought” is not necessarily a word of will that will be followed by action.
We can see three different moral apparatus in existence:
1. Two from conflicting sources (obligation, duty or principle)
2. and one is our own moral outlook.
I think what he mean by the cause of moral dilemma is the result of inadequacy of moral outlook in oneself. Deprive of moral, one will encounter dilemma if given two conflicting sources. By sources it must mean obligation, duty and principle. Thus every time obligation conflict with principle—while each of them has their own moral demand that govern their fulfillment—moral dilemma arises as apparent in Platonic case.
Dilemma arises when we lack moral outlook (immoral?) in facing these conflicting sources. So it must be a waste of time to seek guidance from our own private ethical code when moral dilemma occurs simply because we lack the needed views.
It is important to note the dissimilarity of making 1) a decision in a moral dilemma situation and 2) resolving the moral dilemma itself.
When a person in a situation of moral dilemma, the decision he make, doesn’t necessarily mean that the moral dilemma is resolved. He might still feel the existence of the dilemma in himself although he already has decided which action he should take (a decision in a moral dilemma situation). If for any reason that he does not feel the dilemma anymore, it is because he has adapted or create a “new moral outlook” in him thus deprive the existence of the moral dilemma (resolving the moral dilemma itself).
The remarkable difference of this sort of moral dilemma was that in order to preserve moral dilemma, a person in that situation will always make a decision that is not morally related. Lemmon proposed “consideration of ends” as an exemplary solution. Thus one will decide which “end” the course of action will give the best result. This solution while solving and decide which course of action one should take doesn’t implicate moral at all.
It is interesting to note that if one failed to make a decision—is itself a decision. One cannot ‘solve’ moral dilemma by running away from it.
We have discussed sources which possess their own intrinsic moral demand. What about sources which has none or lack of it? The second class of moral dilemma is called “dilemmatic in the full sense” by Lemmon. Citing example from Sartre, it is a situation when we do not know the moral demand of our obligation, duty and principle. A young man doesn’t know whether principle requires him to fight for Free French thus avenging his brother death in war or duty requires him to stay with his mother. Any decision that he make will marks the changed in moral outlook thus his overall attitude similar to one changed preferences from conservative to liberal or from being religious to atheism. The adoption of a new morality by an agent is frequently associated with the confrontation of moral dilemma.
The third class is an extreme moral dilemma. Not only that the person doesn’t know what morality requires of him (as evident in the second class), he doesn’t even have the moral outlook for working it out. He cited moral dilemma that faced Chamberlain in the negotiation with Hitler as an example. The extreme moral dilemma can require us to create new moral outlook. One of consideration in creating a new moral outlook is the desire to be true to oneself.
1. Simplest form
2. Dilemmatic in the full sense
3. Extreme moral dilemma
I
The first type of moral dilemma, Lemmon took seriously the “crisis” of moral dilemmas mentioned in my last piece “the dilemma of moral dilemmas” and it can be sense throughout his writings.
For him, there is no contradiction between “ought to” and “ought not” simply because it is not a will like “must” and “must not”. So I ought to close the window and I ought not to close the window at the same time because “ought” is not necessarily a word of will that will be followed by action.
We can see three different moral apparatus in existence:
1. Two from conflicting sources (obligation, duty or principle)
2. and one is our own moral outlook.
I think what he mean by the cause of moral dilemma is the result of inadequacy of moral outlook in oneself. Deprive of moral, one will encounter dilemma if given two conflicting sources. By sources it must mean obligation, duty and principle. Thus every time obligation conflict with principle—while each of them has their own moral demand that govern their fulfillment—moral dilemma arises as apparent in Platonic case.
Dilemma arises when we lack moral outlook (immoral?) in facing these conflicting sources. So it must be a waste of time to seek guidance from our own private ethical code when moral dilemma occurs simply because we lack the needed views.
It is important to note the dissimilarity of making 1) a decision in a moral dilemma situation and 2) resolving the moral dilemma itself.
When a person in a situation of moral dilemma, the decision he make, doesn’t necessarily mean that the moral dilemma is resolved. He might still feel the existence of the dilemma in himself although he already has decided which action he should take (a decision in a moral dilemma situation). If for any reason that he does not feel the dilemma anymore, it is because he has adapted or create a “new moral outlook” in him thus deprive the existence of the moral dilemma (resolving the moral dilemma itself).
The remarkable difference of this sort of moral dilemma was that in order to preserve moral dilemma, a person in that situation will always make a decision that is not morally related. Lemmon proposed “consideration of ends” as an exemplary solution. Thus one will decide which “end” the course of action will give the best result. This solution while solving and decide which course of action one should take doesn’t implicate moral at all.
It is interesting to note that if one failed to make a decision—is itself a decision. One cannot ‘solve’ moral dilemma by running away from it.
II
We have discussed sources which possess their own intrinsic moral demand. What about sources which has none or lack of it? The second class of moral dilemma is called “dilemmatic in the full sense” by Lemmon. Citing example from Sartre, it is a situation when we do not know the moral demand of our obligation, duty and principle. A young man doesn’t know whether principle requires him to fight for Free French thus avenging his brother death in war or duty requires him to stay with his mother. Any decision that he make will marks the changed in moral outlook thus his overall attitude similar to one changed preferences from conservative to liberal or from being religious to atheism. The adoption of a new morality by an agent is frequently associated with the confrontation of moral dilemma.
III
The third class is an extreme moral dilemma. Not only that the person doesn’t know what morality requires of him (as evident in the second class), he doesn’t even have the moral outlook for working it out. He cited moral dilemma that faced Chamberlain in the negotiation with Hitler as an example. The extreme moral dilemma can require us to create new moral outlook. One of consideration in creating a new moral outlook is the desire to be true to oneself.
This type of moral dilemma is:
1. Easier—he know for sure that he need a some basic moral rethinking
2. Harder—basic moral rethinking is harder work than working with existing moral principle.
E.J. Lemmon cited two things that he would like to see to be done:
Conclusion…
E.J. Lemmon cited two things that he would like to see to be done:
1. detailed breakdown of different kind of difficult moral situations.
2. Discussion that can resolve moral dilemmas.
This can help distinguish bad and good moral reason for making moral decision
This can help distinguish bad and good moral reason for making moral decision
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